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Moritz Feichtinger and Stephan Malinowski
Translated by Chase Richards
Transformative Invasions:
Western Post-9/11 Counterinsurgency and the
Lessons of Colonialism
The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the
trouble and the other 75 percent lies in getting the people of
this country behind us.
—British General Gerald Templer, Malaya, 19521
Having someone who can speak Arabic is like having another
infantry battalion.
—U.S. General John Mattis, 1st Marine Division, Iraq, 20082
One of the greatest surprises in the debate over the so-called New World Order in the
final decade of the twentieth century was how the concept of empire won an aston-
ishing new respectability. The word ‘‘empire,’’ which for decades had possessed a
negative connotation (especially in American usage), increasingly took on a positive
resonance—and not just among journalists.3 For theorists and policymakers, the
notion of a ‘‘good empire’’ once again became thinkable: empire as a multicultural,
flexible form of power operating across vast distances that could promote (if not guar-
antee) human rights, development, order, and prosperity.4 In order to justify the use
of force, however, this concept ‘‘good empire’’ required both the development of a
suitable new form of warfare and a reformulated narrative legitimation of this warfare.5
In the post–Cold War geopolitical environment, American debates over foreign
interventions no longer pivoted around the old battle lines of internationalism or
isolationism but increasingly around the politically sharpened concept of genocide
prevention. In the United States, the belief that military operations could prevent or
halt genocides led to an astonishing alliance of left-liberal humanitarian interven-
tionism with neoconservative expansionism.6 On the one hand, neither the Cold War
nor the conventional wars of the twentieth century provided usable models for the
execution of ‘‘transformative invasions,’’ which after 9/11 appeared to have become the
norm.7 On the other hand, references to humanitarian objectives, human rights,
American interventionism, and United Nations mandates were not enough to make
sense of this new form of transformative invasion. Instead, this new form of warfare,
combining humanism and Machtpolitik, had historical roots in a different, rather
unexpected place: in the guerilla wars of late European colonialism, which took place
from the late 1940s through the early 1960s.
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The goal of this essay is to analyze how American and Western European armies
have appropriated the operational and conceptual arsenal of European late-colonial
warfare and adjusted it to suit their current political objectives. This reception and
adaptation of late-colonial approaches to how war is fought, we argue, takes place
both in the operational conduct of current Western military interventions and in the
portrayal of these wars before a national and international public. Identifying the
structural parallels between late-colonial wars and current Western interventions helps
to explain why some of today’s most important military theorists and planners find
themselves attracted to the strategies deployed by European powers during the late-
colonial wars.
In the decade since 9/11, the formula of ‘‘learning to eat soup with a knife’’ (often
attributed to Lawrence of Arabia) has become a watchword for the adaptation of
Western armies to the altered demands of what at first was called the ‘‘Global War on
Terror’’ but which is now more commonly referred to as the ‘‘Long War.’’8 In addition
to homegrown American traditions originating with presidents Theodore Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson, the idea of conducting military-led missions against barbarism,
injustice, and underdevelopment has roots in European colonialism.9 Proponents of a
systematic appropriation of European late-colonial war experiences criticize the inade-
quate strategy, tactics, and doctrines of conventional Western armies in combat with
guerilla armies in Third World regions. They call for an institutional and political
learning process, in which Western democracies integrate their military, development,
and propaganda machineries into innovative apparatuses capable of bringing a lasting
end to insurgencies—less through firepower than through development programs and
aid. These approaches to countering guerilla fighters, first developed and tested during
late-colonial wars, appear to their contemporary advocates to be the most militarily
and politically plausible options currently available to Western states. The advocates
of this integrated approach envision a democratic utopia of a war that is not war at all
but instead a military-flanked development effort in underdeveloped areas. In sum,
although Western states present their current wars in new humanitarian bottles, the
dregs from the old wine of the search for colonial order remains.
One might suppose that few elements of the five-hundred-year history of violent
European colonial conquest, occupation, expulsion, exploitation, and murder would
seem readily available for reappropriation by democratic states in the twenty-first
century.10 Yet if we nonetheless observe astounding resonances between post-1945
decolonization wars and contemporary warfare, this is because both of these forms of
war are very different from both pre-1945 interstate continental warfare and from the
previously established patterns of colonial wars up to that point. Specifically, the wars
currently waged by the Western powers rehabilitate the concept of counterinsurgency
that was first developed during the late-colonial wars. The integrated political-military
strategy of antiguerilla warfare addressed operational and political problems that also
arise in contemporary conflicts between democracies and guerilla armies. In both the
late-colonial wars and the contemporary ‘‘Long War,’’ international and domestic
publics follow the interventionist power’s conduct of the war with a critical eye: the
former primarily with respect to compliance with putatively ‘‘universal moral stan-
dards,’’ which the latter supplement with attention to the costs of the operation.
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During the 1950s and 1960s, Western colonial powers developed novel strategies
for waging war in culturally foreign zones of the post-imperial periphery. Though
militarily these strategies built on older approaches associated with earlier colonial
wars, what distinguished this new mode of warfare was the functional integration of
destruction and development, of military and civil forces for the lasting transformation
of societies. New doctrines and strategies were invented for scenarios in which the
adversary was not an opposing army but rather segments of the population itself. In
these scenarios, the stylized experience of Western technical superiority, according to
which small groups of European soldiers could slaughter a tenfold numerical superi-
ority of African or Asian fighters, was useless. These scenarios involved a frontier but
almost never a front, demanded a reliable separation of civilians from combatants, and
made the ‘‘winning-over’’ of segments of the civilian population vital.11 These were,
finally, scenarios in which a critical domestic public, a highly developed international
media environment, and the still fresh memory of the horrors of World War II
conspired not only to set high moral standards concerning the application of physical
force but also to encourage skepticism about the effectiveness of such efforts.
Operating in post-heroic societies, Western societies after 1945 demanded that leaders
engage in elaborate efforts to ‘‘sell’’ and legitimate wars.12 Within the circle of the
colonial powers, it was democratic states that first developed not only capable propa-
ganda apparatuses but also, in the final phase of colonial rule after 1945, strategies both
for separating civilians from combatants within the context of warfare and for offering
them programs for economic and cultural ‘‘development.’’ In all these respects, the
experience of late-colonial warfare in the 1950s rehearsed the arguments and legiti-
mation strategies for wars waged by today’s democracies.
Rarely has that leading metaphor of postcolonial studies, the colonial archive, been
so visible and accessible as in the case presented here, namely, the contemporary redis-
covery and adaptation of late-colonial techniques of violence, power, and domination.
Contemporary military leaders operating ‘‘amidst the population’’ face a remarkably
(indeed disturbingly) similar mission to that of the late-colonial warrior: to construct
a civil-military war machine using a complex combination of scholarly guidance,
development expertise, and both metropolitan and local military forces. The apologists
of counterinsurgency depict it as a form of war that minimizes violence generally and
casualties specifically, that realizes lasting improvement and ‘‘development’’ for the
target population, and that therefore is not really ‘‘war’’ at all. The combination of
violence, scientific consultancy, and comprehensive social engineering—through
which the enemy should not be annihilated but persuaded and modernized—seems
especially typical of democratic states. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially
since the post-9/11 intervention in Afghanistan and the attack on Iraq in March 2003,
these combat strategies and legitimation paradigms have gained sharply in importance.
The isolation of ‘‘drivers’’ from ‘‘spoilers of change’’ has been central to the directives
that General David Petraeus issued as Supreme Commander of the Allied Troops in
Afghanistan: ‘‘Separate reconcilables from the irreconcilables. Identify and report
obstacles to reintegration. . . . Identify and kill, capture, drive out, or turn the irrecon-
cilables.’’13 Similarly, the French division general and historian Henri Paris has
proclaimed that the Taliban ‘‘must of course be pursued and slaughtered, but solely it
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alone, within the framework of legality and without unnecessary and indiscriminate
violence.’’14 Alas, today’s troops face the same difficulties of doctrinal interpretation
that the late-colonial forces did half a century ago: how to determine the ‘‘necessary
degree of force’’—the definition of which appears nowhere in the field manuals. ‘‘The
Field Manual tells us what to achieve,’’ the contemporary counterinsurgency theorist
David Kilcullen has admitted, ‘‘but not what to do.’’15 Counterinsurgency doctrines
during late-colonial wars were not more precise on this point, but the observation by
the public at home has become more severe since. If military necessity still defines the
‘‘necessary’’ degree of force, it is the media hothouse of the home front that defines
the ‘‘acceptable’’ degree of force.
In claiming a continuity between late-colonial wars and the current ‘‘humani-
tarian’’ wars, we should hasten to add that the contemporary belligerent democracies
do not think of themselves as colonial powers, nor do they think of their wars as
colonial wars. Still, the overall aim of the Western powers is to increase control over
economic, strategic, and political spheres and to bring non-Westerners closer to the
West. The following observations bear primarily on Afghanistan, but since the 2006
change in strategy (the so-called surge) they pertain in principle to the war in Iraq as
well. At the same time, the strategic adaptations discussed here are broadly general-
izable. As a type, the ‘‘transformative invasion’’ is already international on account of
its applications; it is global on account of the historical points of reference and the
markedly global focus of its strategies.16
The Struggle for Hearts and Minds: The Late-Colonial Wars of the 1950s and 1960s
In the cataracts of World War I, alongside the Europe-dominated world order, the
Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg, and German empires were washed away. At the edges
of these shatter zones arose zones of violence that were not to be ‘‘pacified,’’ often for
decades.17 While the British, French, and Dutch colonial empires remained intact
(and indeed expanded) after 1918, independence movements became much more
dynamic.18 The fragility of imperial control became undeniable during World War
II—the loss of Singapore in February 1942 is emblematic—and then glaring after the
end of the war, when the evolution of the European blueprint for peace in the Western
hemisphere stood harshly at odds with violence-filled uprisings in colonial territories.
While some in the European colonial establishment sought to retain or restore their
privileges after 1945, the ultimately unsuccessful French and Dutch attempts to reassert
their imperial authority in Indochina and Indonesia demonstrated that the traditional
mode of imperial rule was no longer viable.19 The constantly growing, internationally
connected, and media-conveyed pressure of Asian and African independence move-
ments, on the one hand, and the unambiguous anticolonial rhetoric of both the
American and the Soviet superpowers, on the other, made new concepts for safe-
guarding or reshaping colonial rule unavoidable.20
As the idea of retaining indirect influence in formally independent states replaced
the hopes for continued direct rule, imperial counterinsurgency had to be radically
reconceptualized.21 Instead of aiming to quash all independence efforts, the goal
became to ensure an ‘‘orderly transition.’’ Such late-colonial counterstrategies directed
military force against independence movements with a ‘‘revolutionary’’ agenda, while
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at the same time engaging in political and civil reforms whereby potential postcolonial
elites capable of ensuring ‘‘continuity’’ were to be recruited and supported. A society-
wide politics of modernization and development, intended to supersede and replace
colonial rule through the triad of democracy, prosperity, and modernity, formed the
correlate to military force, which would orient itself with all the greater vehe-
mence—at least theoretically—against insurgents. This ‘‘political’’ approach to
antiguerilla warfare was discussed under the umbrella term ‘‘population-centric coun-
terinsurgency,’’ or COIN.22
Counterinsurgency as a strategic military concept has historically developed from
positions of political weakness. The works of classical counterinsurgency theory, which
is to say, the canon of doctrines on antiguerilla combat formulated between 1950 and
1970, arose in the face of an invigorated postwar manifestation of anticolonial insur-
rection, the Mao-inspired ‘‘people’s war,’’ in which modern techniques of mass
organization and mobilization seemed to mix with the energy of an antimodern
fervor.23 Just as the concept ‘‘insurgency’’ describes a phenomenon that unites
elements of ‘‘rebellion’’ with guerilla war yet at the same time goes beyond the sum
of these parts, so is counterinsurgency far more than the sum of its military problem-
solving approaches.24 A striking counterrevolutionary euphoria distinguishes the
doctrines and strategies of counterinsurgency formulated in the decolonization phase
from older concepts of imperial policing and pacification.25
Perhaps best characterized by the term ‘‘transformative invasion,’’ the specific type
of warfare developed during the late-colonial period applied a substantial portion of
its machinery not to destruction but rather to development. Both in the perception
of their strategists and in the eyes of the public, such wars were (and still are) waged
in order to contain violence, to create democratic and Western-shaped societies, and
to guarantee stability. The concept of the restriction of force and the tight imbrication
of pacification, stabilization, and development conferred upon this form of warfare a
relatively high degree of acceptance, even before the critical tribunals of democratic
societies. Wars of decolonization served as hothouses for the invention of euphemisms
appropriate for wars of long-lasting occupation and transformation. Political-juridical
concepts like ‘‘state of exception,’’ ‘‘mission,’’ and ‘‘intervention’’ permitted a high
level of military engagement, while avoiding the need for parliamentary debate or
public approval, in a way that would have been much more difficult in a formally
declared war.26 The Algerian War, during which the French military deployed a
conscript force of half a million soldiers, was described within official French parlance
not as a war but as ‘‘measures toward the maintenance of order’’—a designation that
was only changed in 1999.27 The British war in Malaya yielded comparable concepts.
The designation ‘‘emergency,’’ for example, was chosen not least because insurance
companies would not have compensated for damages incurred there in the event of a
declared war. The British also developed a nomenclature for their enemies that has
since found adoption many times over: after it became clear to the British that the
originally selected term ‘‘bandit’’ could be associated with romantic notions of social
rebellion, they established the use of the label ‘‘terrorist’’ for the communist guerilla.28
The corollary to this was the discursive construction of a ‘‘civilian population’’ whose
protection would justify measures such as forced resettlement.
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The Malayan Emergency of 1948–60 was and continues to be recognized as a
textbook example of a successful counterinsurgency campaign.29 Although martial law
persisted on the Southeast Asian peninsula for twelve years, and though its leader,
Ching Peng, did not surrender until 1989, the (rather weak) communist guerilla forces
were militarily marginalized already from 1952 onward.30 In 1960, with the estab-
lishment of the Malayan Federation, the creation of a multiethnic and democratic
postcolonial state appeared as an exemplary instance of decolonization; from then on
Malaya was considered ‘‘the domino that stood still.’’31 The military approach of the
British, or rather the combination of military with political means through counterin-
surgency, centered on ‘‘winning the hearts and minds of the population’’—a phrase
credited to General Gerald Templer, the commander of the Malayan campaign.32
Central to the campaign’s success, according to all subsequent theorists of counterin-
surgency operations, was the forced resettlement in camps of large portions of the
Chinese minority population, which was how the British attempted to solve the core
problem of all guerilla wars, namely, how to differentiate insurgents from civilians.
Although one might have expected that postwar Europeans would have been leery
of the concept of forced, concentrated resettlements, a functional and semantic shift
on the part of colonial officials enabled its ready acceptance: the negatively connoted
concept of ‘‘the camp’’ was simply avoided, and instead one spoke of ‘‘new villages.’’
Although the Nuremberg Trials and the codification of human rights had promised
to establish new universal standards in international politics, European colonial
powers created a parallel world, specifically in the form of colonial camp systems and
systematic expulsions in which none of the new standards held legal force.33 Func-
tionally, too, these strategic settlements far exceeded the mere concentration of a hard-
to-control population. Although sentries and barbed-wire fences advertised the core
function of these settlements, the ‘‘new villages’’ were also conceived as model sites
for accelerated modernization.34 Resettled civilians were supposed to discover a
standard of living that would exceed that of their former settlements many times over.
Schools, infirmaries, playing fields, cafes, and sanitary infrastructure would win over
the inhabitants of the resettlement villages to the side of the government. In many
late-colonial settings, urbanization and resettlement measures were additionally
combined with attempts to deploy architecture as well as city and land planning
toward the directed ‘‘modernization’’ of the society in question.35
The new villages of late-colonial warfare in the 1950s arguably constitute the most
striking site for studying the transition from the concept of ‘‘civilizing mission’’ to the
concept of a ‘‘modernizing mission.’’36 In terms of both content and structure,
attempts at forced modernization echoed the nineteenth-century rhetoric of ‘‘civilizing
missions.’’ What made the post-1945 military-enforced efforts at modernization a
discrete new model rather than merely a remake of older ones was the integrated civil-
military apparatus, the democratic ambitions, and the performative imperative before
a critical domestic and international public—with Auschwitz as the negative, and the
UN as the positive, reference. Committed to the universalist spirit of the Cold War,
the new theories of development and modernization paradoxically seemed most thor-
oughly realizable precisely where they were flanked and facilitated by military force.37
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The late-colonial wars were thus laboratories for testing the theoretical model of forced
modernization.38
Outside of the resettlement camps, too, the European colonial powers deployed a
considerable arsenal of development programs in their struggle for hearts and minds.
Particular attention was paid to women and children. Educational campaigns in
colonial contexts were never ends in themselves. In the late-colonial phase, state-run
schools and educational programs augmented missionary-run schools.39 Along with
the teaching of basic knowledge and skills such as writing and arithmetic, these schools
took special care to impart ‘‘modern’’ values and attitudes: inculcating individualism,
openness to technical innovations, and skepticism toward ‘‘traditional’’ social struc-
tures and ways of life. During the Algerian War, for instance, the French authorities
promoted literacy among girls as a way to realign the cellule familiale musulmane,
which in turn was regarded as the key to the ‘‘modernization’’ of the entire Algerian
society.40 Military-civil directives unapologetically expressed the demographic and
biopolitical goals of colonial emancipation politics: ‘‘Educational policy must be
directed toward girls as much as toward boys. Women’s development is crucial. It is a
condition for all true emancipation. It will contribute to reining in the galloping
demographic growth of this land.’’41 The late-colonial state assumed an especially
benevolent demeanor not only toward young girls but also toward adult women.
Yet in the late-colonial wars, in which many of the independence movements
counted a considerable number of women among their ranks, questions of emanci-
pation and the position of women became a central arena for disputes.42 Colonial
regulation of family, honor, and legal codes was in many places perceived as the
clearest manifestation of foreign domination.43 For the organs of the colonial state, on
the other hand, targeted attention to women did not simply promise to heighten the
effect of political and social reforms; on the propagandistic home front, protecting
colonial women from their own society served as an illustration of the humanitarian
aims of colonial war. Staged deveiling campaigns in Algerian cities offer but one
example of how the army of a Western democracy could cater to an emancipationist
politics.44 In the contested interiors of comparable decolonization wars, too, women
became in a new way victims of direct, often sexual, violence, but also the targets of a
whole array of state campaigns for reeducation and development, from courses sewing
and childrearing or nutritional counseling to fashion shows. The Sections Administra-
tives Spe´cialise´es (SAS) moved from mountain village to mountain village distributing
thousands of sewing machines (and other household appliances) in the name of the
‘‘modernization’’ of Algerian women. ‘‘Women’s clubs’’ and ‘‘solidarity committees,’’
not infrequently led by the wives of high-ranking colonial officers, were also active in
internment and resettlement camps. Organized radio evenings and film screenings
were likewise part of the ‘‘humanitarian’’ strand within Europe’s most brutal late-
colonial war.45
In Kenya, the British authorities developed a parallel set of practices as a response
to the disturbingly high proportion of women in the revolutionary movement of the
so-called Mau Mau. Under the guise of ‘‘rehabilitation,’’ the agents of British colo-
nialism in Kenya (who were often female Christian missionaries) sought to assist the
Kenyan women’s passage ‘‘into modernity’’ by imposing new forms of gender relations
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that conformed to idealized Western norms of the time: political abstinence and
concentration on domestic duties within the nuclear family.46 The motto that was
applied to not only gender and family relations but also the reorganization of the
entire society was the same then as it is today: stabilization.47 Wherever late-colonial
officials tried to transform ‘‘traditional’’ societies permanently and to set them on a
course agreeable to European norms, the female portion of the respective societies
constituted the most important lever for doing so, at least in the colonial imagination.
Such granular efforts at late-colonial social engineering were often embedded in
socioeconomic master plans for the transformation of entire societies. Although the
export boom unleashed by the Korean War made it possible to finance the conversion
of landless Chinese and small farmers into a mobile rural reserve of labor power in
Malaya, similar plans for Kenya and Algeria failed.48 Measures for the provision of
work, which on the ground were hard to distinguish from forced labor, and the
division of landholdings, which privileged European settlers and trusted collaborators
of the colonial administration, often remained the sole realized forms of these ambi-
tious plans. Nevertheless, this constitutes a decisive difference from most interstate
wars of the twentieth century and also from earlier colonial wars in which compre-
hensive development programs were neither planned nor attempted. A form of war in
which soldiers distribute chocolate to the conquered civilians, in which generals grant
credits for single-family houses and promote modern pieces of furniture, might be
hard to find outside of the specific historical constellation of the ‘‘transformative
invasion.’’ Such plans—which envisioned the in vitro production of modern subjects
who followed Western patterns of consumption and culture—could never entirely be
realized within the constraints of bitterly waged late-colonial wars. All the same, the
effects of forced modernization and ‘‘uprooting,’’ still so visible today, have been
enormous.49
The late-colonial wars also drastically transformed the self-understanding and self-
portrayal of European colonial armies. Few images better illustrate the development
work of colonial armies than the figure of military vehicles repurposed to plow fields.50
The same can be said of soldiers and reserve officers who acted as uniformed teachers
or doctors. Yet at the same time it was indispensable for the acceptance of military-
flanked development programs to give them as clearly civilian a character as possible.
While members of the uniformed military performed many of these ‘‘developmental’’
functions, every effort was made to ensure the co-deployment of civilian personnel
such as missionaries, nurses, volunteer development aides, and NGOs.
These new sorts of colonial agents were not only to be found in propaganda
brochures; they also influenced the structure of the late-colonial military machinery.
They gave birth to units specially trained to take over civil administrative functions
and establish close contact with representatives of the local population. Apart from
the strategically meaningful attempt to gain reliable information on local conditions,
experiments with forms of administration and local community were conducted at a
depth and scale that prewar imperial rule had neither aspired to nor required.51 The
furtherance of regional and local self-administration thereby operated both as a legiti-
mation strategy and as a hegemonic technique, for the newly established
rapprochements were meant to bring long-term ties into being that would render
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military force obsolete. Maurice Challe, commander-in-chief of the French troops
during the Algerian War, neatly encapsulated this altered set of priorities in a 1973
interview: ‘‘One was fighting at the time not for control of a few hectares of land or
for the conquest of a province, [but rather to] win over the population, and both
parties offered a political future for this. . . . This political outlook inhered in legal
equality, the advancement of Muslims to the French level—things which have not
been achieved in the 130 years of occupation.’’52 Just as the colonial armies themselves
had to adapt their form to the changed requirements of the task, so too did the wars
of late colonialism lead to the rise of an officer type that differed fundamentally from
the military elite deployed during the two world wars.
In terms of military experience, the generation of officers whose defining coordi-
nates bore the names Blitzkrieg, Stalingrad, El-Alamein, Midway, Dresden, and
Hiroshima had little to offer the asymmetric wars of late colonialism. For the waging
of such wars, this generation could draw only partially on older experiences from the
history of colonialism; most often, it had to improvise new concepts.53 To develop a
successful counterinsurgency concept, these officers emphasized the army’s aptitude
for learning and adaption, as well as the fusion of civilian with military commands.
The ‘‘tiger of Malaya,’’ General Templer, became the paragon of the prudent late-
colonial military commander, a man who recognized the political and military chal-
lenges at the right time and in the right place and then took the right steps to meet
them.54 At a deeper level of hierarchy, the colonial powers produced an officer type
characterized by a complete adjustment to local conditions and the requirements of
counterinsurgency. Over the course of three decades, such specialists often ended up
as counterinsurgency practitioners and advisors not just once but repeatedly on various
continents in various colonies, applying the ‘‘lessons’’ from previous campaigns to
later ones. The British officer Sir Robert Thompson, for instance, acquired experience
in Palestine, Cyprus, and Malaya, which he then passed on as a military advisor in
Kenya and later South Vietnam.55 This counterinsurgency expertise also passed
between armies: French officers like Roger Trinquier and David Galula, who emerged
as strategic masterminds of the new warfare in Indochina and Algeria, went on to
serve as consultants for the United States as well as various Latin American armies and
became widely read authorities in the counterinsurgency literature.56
Among the most remarkable innovations of late-colonial warfare and counterin-
surgency was the high degree to which this body of doctrine drew on the expertise of
the social sciences. Even though colonialism was more important to the development
of ethnography than the other way around, and even though the significance of the
scholarly contribution to colonial practice should not be overestimated, the efforts on
the part of late-colonial officials to renew the interconnection is noteworthy. Plans for
transforming the colonies used the academic ethnography and social sciences of their
day to create reading aids, instructions for soldiers and colonial administrators, and
legitimation campaigns (both in the colonies and on the home front).
The anticolonial insurgency in 1950s Kenya engendered perhaps the most bizarre
forms of militarized social science, whereby sociological pseudo-experts came to
exercise great influence over the courses of action taken by the government. Social
scientists helped to interpret and to make sense of the insurgency; they advised
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colonial authorities to tell friend from foe and to pragmatically define reconcilables
and irreconcilables. As white settlers and political elites in London struggled to under-
stand the insurgency in terms of older models of anticolonial rioting (labeling it a
‘‘yell from the swamp’’), the ‘‘scientific’’ advice of scholars and putative experts gained
a considerable hearing.57 Both military ethnographers and renowned experts in the
culture of the Kikuyu not only psychopathologized the uprising as a kind of tribal
mass psychosis but also actively participated in drafting counterstrategies against the
same, occasionally even implementing these in personal cooperation with the army.
Thus ‘‘Her Majesty’s witch doctors’’ acted in Kenya as exorcists and masters of
ceremony in staged mass conversions held at captive reeducation camps.58 The self-
styled ethno-psychiatrist John Carothers claimed to elucidate ‘‘the soul’’ of the Mau
Mau Uprising and purported to lend a helping hand for the lasting alteration of
Kenyan society.59 Echoing the assumptions of contemporary American modernization
theory, Carothers diagnosed the insurgents as suffering from difficulties in the tran-
sition form ‘‘traditional’’ to ‘‘modern’’ life.
Arguably even more influential was Louis Leakey, who grew up bilingual in Kenya
as the child of English missionaries, became an initiated member of the Kikuyu and
then later studied at Cambridge before embarking upon an idiosyncratic yet meteoric
career as a paleoanthropologist and ethnographer. During the Mau Mau Uprising,
Leakey served as an advisor, translator, and spy for the British government. His duties
included attempting to translate Mau Mau ‘‘oathing,’’ so central to the identity and
solidarity of the rebels, into the language of British Machtpolitik.60 Carothers and
Leakey both helped to invent a counteroath and to outline mechanisms and tech-
niques of reeducation and rehabilitation aimed at crushing the rebellion of the former
subjects of their studies. In sum, the belief that social scientists might help colonial
officials understand the breaking points within traditional societies, as well as reveal
levers for reconstructing these societies as modern ones, was popular especially among
the liberal parts of the colonial and political elites in 1950s efforts at forced moderniza-
tion.
In Malaya and Algeria, too, scholarly findings about the ‘‘Chinese mind’’ or the
‘‘slavish character of the Muslim’’ played a considerable role in the formulation of
political and military strategies.61 During the Algerian War, Jacques Soustelle, a
renowned anthropologist, served for a time as governor, employing Germaine Tillion,
a heroine of the French Resistance, an ethnographer, and expert in North African
Berber culture, as his advisor for the ‘‘modernization’’ of the country.62 Both the
conduct of war and the organization of the colonial armies itself experienced a strong
tendency toward scientization. With statistical inquiries into development efforts,
mathematical calculation of enemy troop numbers, and multicolor diagrams, the lead-
erships of colonial armies tried—above all when compelled to justify their exploding
budgets—to persuasively ‘‘prove’’ their progress, which naturally would become
apparent only over longer time spans. The militarily and socially engineered attempt
to reduce the ‘‘enemy masses’’ to a manageable size yielded various systems of categori-
zation. In Kenya, for example, the British divided Kikuyu camp detainees into three
categories: white for those capable of resettlement; gray for those susceptible of reedu-
cation; black for those to be detained indefinitely. The liberal segment of the British
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colonial administration, at least, had interpreted the Kikuyu uprising as a crisis of
modernization and consequently had wanted to construe the camps as part of a
program of controlled and accelerated modernization.63
Rediscovery and Adaptation in the Twenty-First Century
At the start of the twenty-first century, Western states have entered into modes of
military engagement that show astonishing similarities to the wars of late colonialism,
despite the fact that none of today’s Western states aspires to defend or return to
colonial rule. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Western militaries had immense kinetic
capabilities at their disposal, but virtually no doctrine or capability for administering
civilians. In terms of the intellectual and professional pedigree of officer elites, the
imprint of the Cold War and the Fulda Gap, or of ICBMs and nuclear arsenals, had
become irrelevant to the problems posed by the Long War. In the aftermath of 9/11,
the Western powers showed themselves immensely capable of blowing the doors off
of opposing regimes with ‘‘shock and awe,’’ but signally incapable of forging the
targeted societies anew. In Iraq and Afghanistan, a purely military strategy reliant on
firepower and cutting-edge technology was followed by a neoconservative master plan
for the democratization of a ‘‘Greater Middle East’’ that would repeat the success
stories of Germany and Japan after 1945—only to result in horrifying and bewildering
insurgencies.64
In the face of these failures, the search for more practicable concepts intensified,
leading to a remarkable rediscovery of the late-colonial wars. Largely out of sight of
both social scientists and the wider public, these historical experiences have become
over the last decade the object of intense discussion in military circles as potential
sources of ideas and techniques relevant to the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and other battle spaces of the Long War. Military interest in the history of ‘‘small
wars,’’ as the British officer Charles Callwell termed them in 1896, has multiplied.65
Influential groups of young, conspicuously intellectual officers in the United States
and various Western European democracies have tried to distill viable military
doctrine from the scattered experiences of the late-colonial wars. Under the rubric of
‘‘expanding the learning curve,’’ the French and British armies have treated the history
of the late-colonial wars as a mine from which to quarry raw materials for strategies
and techniques relevant in the present.66 In particular, the French army has synthe-
sized its own colonial experiences in elaborately documented treatises, comparing
them to contemporary British experiences and interpreting them as suitable models
for today’s Long War. In this way the late-colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria have
been quietly reframed not as national tragedies to avoid repeating at all costs, but
rather as helpful pilot studies in the Long War.67 This reframing of the colonial archive
as a useful technical resource has been a transnational process, culminating in one
concept: ‘‘population-centric counterinsurgency.’’
Fashioning the Scholar-Warrior
The concept of counterinsurgency, previously connected both to the American
debacle in Vietnam and dirty, inconclusive proxy wars in Latin America, has experi-
enced a staggering revival, helped along by rebranding under the acronym COIN.68
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As conventional military superiority has been neutralized by national and international
outrage at high civilian casualties—it is simply not politically acceptable to kill tens of
thousands of civilians, as it was during World War II, for example—counterinsurgency
experts capable of ‘‘thinking holistically’’ (or capable of representing themselves as
such) have become ever more sought after by Western militaries. The result has been
the growing visibility of a peculiar new sort of public military officer: one who
combines command experience and a mastery of strategic thinking with degrees from
elite universities, publications at Oxford University Press, a cultivated demeanor,
careful diction and civil habitus and, above all, media savvy. Self-consciously
distancing themselves from the image of the bull-necked strategist of tanks and fire-
power, who regards the drilling of wells and the handing out of candy as a waste of
time and resources, these scholar-warriors combine deep knowledge of the theater of
military operations with a sensitivity toward the prevailing mentality and culture (the
so-called human terrain) in order to meet the basic prerequisite for the success of a
counterinsurgency operation: the reliable separation of friend from foe, the groups to
be protected from groups to be combated.69 Finally, many of these counterinsurgency
practitioner-intellectuals have shown impressive telegenic communication capabilities
in which the word ‘‘progress’’ does not refer to advancing tank armies but to gigantic
projects whose aim is to convert entire civilizations from violence-breeding ignorance
and backwardness to a more modern, educated, civilized, and peaceful social order.
The best and brightest exemplar of this new officer type is undoubtedly the
American general David Petraeus, the newly appointed director of the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency. Typifying the close relationship between military prowess,
military-historical knowledge, and intellectual foresight, the West Point graduate
obtained his Ph.D. in history from Princeton University in 1987 and went on to teach
at West Point. His doctoral thesis, titled ‘‘The American Military and the Lessons of
Vietnam,’’ addressed a central operational question of modern counterinsurgency:
how can military institutions learn from their mistakes in order to achieve greater
flexibility and enhance their effectiveness? With these intellectual credentials in place,
Petraeus went on to command the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division during the
2003 invasion of Iraq, leading the capture of the city of Mosul. In occupied Iraq, he
assumed responsibility for the build-up of Iraqi security forces and played a decisive
role in the development of reconstruction projects across the country, earning himself
a legendary reputation as a counterinsurgency practitioner. This status spread to a
broad international public when in 2007 he became the front man of the so-called
surge, the intensification of the counterinsurgency efforts with considerably more
troops and equipment. Petraeus codified his insights in the Army’s official Field
Manual 3–24: Counterinsurgency, whose writing he oversaw. In his next position, as
supreme commander in Afghanistan, he reworked the strategy of the International
Security Assistance Force to combine military and civil counterinsurgency efforts, in
the process becoming the prime military and intellectual guru of modern counterin-
surgency.70 Even if the appeasing effects of the surge seem to remain shaky, fragile,
and uncertain—to say the least—an influential interpretation of the Iraq counterinsur-
gency and its result presents the surge as the practical test of strategies and tactics
Western armies now have at their disposal in the battle space of the Long War.71 In
................. 18187$ $CH3 01-20-12 09:45:55 PS
the middle of what had begun to seem like quintessentially ‘‘dirty wars,’’ David
Petraeus’s model of counterinsurgency promised military superiority with a human
face.
In the process of rising to the very apex of the U.S. and NATO military estab-
lishment as the most prominent advocate of counterinsurgency, Petraeus also brought
with him a group of young officers who styled themselves as a progressive subculture
within the military.72 Embodying an updated version of action civilo-militaire—the
tight interlocking of military and civilian strategies that the strategists of late-colonial
warfare propagated—these officers derived the centerpieces of their theory of counter-
insurgency from a deep academic study of the history of late colonialism. For example,
John Nagl, former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, West Point graduate, and
tank officer in Desert Storm, went to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and returned with
a Ph.D. dissertation comparing the British conduct of the colonial war in Malaya
between 1948 and 1960 with American strategy in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. In 2003
he put his professorship at West Point on hold in order to take a command in Iraq.
Thereafter, he developed an astounding productivity as a writer, publishing countless
articles on the problems of the U.S. Army in Iraq and contributing decisively to the
new Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Nagl’s book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife
(the title of which alludes to the putative Lawrence aphorism about the difficulties of
effective anti-guerrilla war fighting) publicized the findings of his dissertation, helping
him to emerge as one of the most influential military intellectuals in the country.73
Today, as president of the Center for a New American Security, a think tank, Nagl
remains influential in Washington and continues to contribute to the ongoing discus-
sions about the military strategies of the United States and its allies in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The revivification of the concept and practice of counterinsurgency may have
started in the United States, but its historical roots are international, and the process
of adaptation has been global. Most of the recently rediscovered doyens of counterin-
surgency served in European armies but already wrote for an international audience
at that point. The aforementioned French officer David Galula (1919–68) was one of
the most prominent precursors of this type. A career officer and graduate of the elite
French military academy Saint-Cyr, he witnessed wars and insurgencies in Africa,
Calcutta, China, Indochina, Greece, and Algeria, both as a practitioner and theore-
tician. After retiring from the army in 1962, he worked for the RAND Corporation
in Santa Monica, California, and held a position as associate professor at Harvard
University’s Center for International Affairs. His 1963 work Counterinsurgency Warfare
had an enormous impact on the American military, even more than on the French
military, which by then was ending its late-colonial wars. After a thirty-five-year delay,
his book was published in French in 2008, now with a foreword from Petraeus, who
proclaimed his French predecessor the ‘‘Clausewitz of counterinsurgency.’’74 Galula’s
ideas and the late-colonial e´cole franc¸aise of counterinsurgency enjoy a formidable
presence in the thinking of Petraeus, and their intellectual fingerprints are all over the
current counterinsurgency handbook of the U.S. Army.75
In the current period, arguably the most active prophet of the counterinsurgency
revival has been the Australian David Kilcullen, who characteristically has combined
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battlefield experience with academic qualifications. Following his dissertation (in
political anthropology) on the suppression of guerillas in Indonesia since 1945, he has
entered into various strategic debates in consistently influential ways, and along with
Nagl he belongs to General Petraeus’s kitchen cabinet.76 Kilcullen’s most notable
proposal has been his suggestion that the ‘‘war on terror’’ should be understood as a
global counterinsurgency campaign.77 His endeavor, in his own words, is to conceptu-
alize a new version of counterinsurgency tailored to the specific conditions of the
twenty-first century.78 The longer the Long War takes, the more the ‘‘military-
intellectual complex,’’ originally developed during the late-colonial wars and the Cold
War, returns with the counterinsurgency apologists of the present.79
Understanding Native Culture
Complementing the intellectualization of the officer caste has been an astounding
growth in the importance of the concept of culture within military thought, an effort
that has entailed much more than mere lip service.80 As during the late-colonial wars,
contemporary civil-military apparatuses have experimented with techniques for
extracting the most precise knowledge possible of the ‘‘hearts’’ meant to be won.
During the late-colonial period and again today, the establishment of ethnographic
contact with the population has lain at the center of these efforts. Just as the image of
an officer, sans helmet, sitting on the ground with loosened clothing while chatting
with the Muslim population frequently was a staple of the propaganda brochures of
the French army in Algeria around 1958, today the cover of the current British counter-
insurgency field handbook shows a photo of a young officer, dressed military-casual,
as he sits with five Afghanis on the ground and appears to lecture. 81 Nor is this simply
a branding exercise: General Petraeus directs his men to take off their Oakley
sunglasses and wherever possible seek out conversation and achieve cooperation with
the population. If a planned three-day ‘‘warrior leader course’’ reveals the limits of the
military’s cultural discoveries, the vast expenditures levied to teach officers ‘‘strategic
foreign languages’’ bear witness to the great earnestness of such efforts.82
By recruiting and deploying ethnographers, Western military apparatuses have
been striving in an unusually intense way to integrate anthropological knowledge of
the culture of the target populations—including knowledge generated during the
colonial period.83 The so-called human terrain system, for instance, under which
rubric British and American armies began in late 2005 to field ethnographically trained
small units at brigade level in order to be able to distinguish between friend and foe
and establish trust-building measures, is structurally very close to older traditions of
the application of ethnographic knowledge for the organization of imperial rule.84 So-
called foreign terrain officers strive to generate interpretations ‘‘in the field’’ that are
both more socio-anthropologically accurate and militarily useful.85 (And allegedly with
positive humanitarian results: the proponents of HTS claim it has reduced the rate of
fatalities caused by allied troops by 60 to 70 percent.)86 Less operational and more
strategic is the advice that ethnographers and other social scientists have offered to
explain (and thus more successfully combat) Islamic martyrdom and the motivational
structures of suicide bombers.87 In sum, a utilitarian, power-oriented attitude toward
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ethnographic knowledge has effectively trumped the once scrupulously circumspect
anthropological approach to war and conflict.88
There has been great criticism of these efforts as leading to an ‘‘armed social
science’’ that threatens to degenerate into a spy unit.89 Concern about the social
sciences feeding a running war machine has reprised Vietnam-era debates and
concerns about the particular contributions of anthropology as the ‘‘handmaiden of
Imperialism.’’90 The cleavage within the social scientific community has a scientific
and a political side. In November 2007 the executive board of the American Anthro-
pological Association distanced itself from academic contributions to the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, speaking of a ‘‘problematic application of anthropological
expertise, most specifically on ethical grounds.’’91 The work of colleagues on the
ground, the board argued, was unprofessional, violated the professional codes of the
discipline, and in many cases exacerbated military conflict.92 Answers to these charges
have been jointly penned by anthropologists and military officers: anthropological
input, they claim, has enabled the effective exertion of influence upon the military
apparatus, reducing violence, saving lives, and eliminating the need for 70 percent of
‘‘kinetic’’ operations.93 In telling ways, this contemporary debate resembles colonial-
era debates on how to make anthropology operational and ‘‘useful.’’ During the 1930s
the leading minds of a ‘‘practical anthropology’’ had successfully praised and
promoted the value of anthropological knowledge for the better organization of
colonial rule. For example, Bronislaw Malinowski hoped to provide colonial officials
with a subtler and gentler understanding of the civilizations they intended to rule.94
Today’s anthropology, as a discipline and a profession, undoubtedly exercises a much
higher degree of critique and skepticism about military and administrative inter-
vention than did colonial-era anthropology. However, two aspects remain unchanged:
first, the desire on the part of some anthropologists to leave the realm of lofty theories,
‘‘to be practical,’’ to reduce violence, and to help people in their ‘‘transition’’ to so-
called modern lifeways; and second, despite rising criticism, military and civil author-
ities seem to have few difficulties finding sufficient quantities of highly motivated
academic advisors with anthropological competence.
Even as parts of the military have officially embraced ethnographic knowledge and
cultural sensitivity as a cornerstone of effective counterinsurgency, the tension on the
ground between the trigger-pulling ‘‘carnivores’’ and the development-focused ‘‘herbi-
vores’’ continues to fester. A certain disdain by the ‘‘practical’’ man for the intellectual
milieu seems to be timeless. The sneer of the later governor of Kenya, Philip E.
Mitchell—that anthropologists are interested in how humans on distant southern isles
eat their grandmothers, while the practical man is concerned for the protection of his
grandmother—continues to capture the frictions between political and military prac-
titioners, on the one hand, and aid workers and social scientists, those ‘‘reluctant
imperialists,’’ on the other.95 German officers in Afghanistan today still make fun of
naive and badly dressed NGO members, just as officers of the regular French army
ridiculed the colonial-era SAS officers in Algeria as ‘‘sweets-soldiers.’’ Relations
between regular army units, population-centered counterinsurgency units, and the
realm of development helpers remain tense, but to a lesser degree than during the late-
colonial wars. Military advisors have already noted the parallels to colonial-era consul-
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tative efforts, independent of the actual results of such cooperation.96 Despite
contemporary anthropology’s critique of collaboration with the military, the oppor-
tunity to leave the airy spheres of academic debate and engage in the rapid
transformation of civilizations remains a tempting offer—one that many anthropolo-
gists find difficult to turn down. The result is that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
integration of anthropological knowledge into the battle space, against misunderstood
enemies, has reached historically unprecedented levels.
Protecting the Women
One rhetorical figure borrowed directly from the wars of decolonization has been
the pretension to improve, through military force, the lot of women in the affected
societies. From the Christianization campaigns of the Conquista to medical-scientific
attempts at improvement, from the children abducted and consigned to European
supervision to the antislavery campaigns around 1900, all the way to the colonial
modernization missions of the 1950s, the claim that Western efforts in the South will
shield local women and children from barbarism has been an eternally recurring
refrain.97 What was new in the late-colonial wars and what returns today is the notion
that these efforts are also central to the effort to ‘‘transform’’ a society and thus quash
the political roots of actual or incipient insurgencies. Contemporary long-term
women’s education programs in places like Afghanistan descend directly from the
arsenals of late-colonial Machtpolitik and 1950s modernization theory. Both then and
now the guiding idea has been that the bullets of military force will pave the road, at
the end of which will stand girls capable of reading and writing, as well as women
who will no longer be mutilated by their husbands.
In an eerie way, reportage and media discussion of the goals of the war in Afghan-
istan repeat formulas of the struggle for the emancipation of the Muslim woman that
were pioneered during the Algerian War. The by now iconographic frontispiece of
Time in December 2001, ‘‘Lifting the Veil,’’ which showed the face of an unveiled
Afghan woman, resembles in every detail that of the New York Times Magazine in July
1958, which under the title ‘‘The Battle of the Veil’’ reported on the French deveiling
campaigns in Algeria.98 In July 2010 the cover of Time displayed the professionally
illuminated face of a young Afghan woman in fabrics and colors that figure to the
Western observer as ‘‘traditional.’’The woman’s nose is missing, in addition to both
of her ears, as the accompanying text reveals. (The young woman had been mutilated
by her husband and brother-in-law after she had proved ‘‘disobedient.’’) The title
underneath: ‘‘What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan?’’99 The motif of protection
forces flown in to safeguard women from the violence of their husbands, uncles, and
brothers was as central to early colonial campaigns against genital mutilation as during
the wars in Kenya and Algeria.100 The image of schools for girls, recurrent in the
Afghanistan debate, as a direct achievement of Western intervention and one to be
defended at any cost has the aspect of a carefully modernized reissue of French propa-
ganda formulas and political concepts from the Algerian War.
Interrogating the Insurgent
The experiences of the decolonization wars also show that both the conduct of
wars and the application of norm-breaking methods of force—such as systematic
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torture—can, under certain conditions, definitely win majority approval in Western
democracies. In democracies the barriers against harsh forms of applied force in the
context of counterinsurgency are regarded as high, yet by no means are they insu-
perable.101 These barriers come to seem surmountable, and a transformative invasion
acceptable, if the enemy can be considered a real threat and the war viewed as
winnable.102 Some months before 9/11, the French brigadier general Paul Aussaresses,
who had gained experience in Indochina and Algeria in matters of counterinsurgency
and ‘‘information gathering,’’ caused a furor with a book in which he candidly
reported on French torture methods in Algeria.103 The former paratrooper, who after
the end of the Algerian War worked for the U.S. Army as an instructor at Fort Bragg,
had time and again emphasized the military value of systematic torture for counterin-
surgency. On American television in January 2002, Aussaresses recommended torture
as an effective tool against Al-Qaida.104 Since that time, a number of influential propo-
nents of information gathering through torture have spoken out in the United States,
referring to practices during colonial wars whenever historical references were
needed.105 As Alan Dershowitz has put it, a democracy should fight with one hand
tied behind its back, but cannot fight with both tied there. In saying this, he refers
not only to Abu-Ghraib but also to colonial examples, particularly the Algerian War:
instead of having torture practiced in the dark realm of illegality, Dershowitz suggests,
it would be better to have clear legal frames for the who, when, how, and to-what-
end of torture.106 Even authors who reject the principle of ‘‘no pain, no gain’’ discuss
the situational necessity of analogous interrogation methods, and with reference to
European experiences in the colonial wars.107
In the twentieth century, public acceptance of torture appears to have reached its
nadir in the years after World War II.108 Nevertheless, counterinsurgency efforts in
various decolonization wars of the 1950s again and again called forth situations that
made the cause of information gathering trump humanitarian objections to ‘‘harsh
interrogation techniques.’’ The struggle of regular armies against insurgents who made
use of ambushes, booby traps, snipers, and time bombs repeatedly justified interroga-
tional torture of captives on the grounds that it could allegedly save the lives of
threatened civilians. The detention of the designated terror pilot Zacarias Moussaoui
in August 2001—and the notion that the timely extraction of his knowledge about
the attacks could have prevented 9/11—reinvigorated the torture debate and in so
doing spawned countless references to the colonial wars, first and foremost the
Algerian War.109 The constellation to this day discussed as a ‘‘ticking bomb scenario’’
by military strategists, philosophers, and social scientists was tellingly first brought
into common parlance in 1960 by Jean Larte´guy’s French bestseller The Centurions, a
novel that connects the Indochina and Algerian wars in narrative fashion.110 Like Gillo
Pontecorvo’s film The Battle of Algiers (1962), the late-colonial quasi-fictional archive
would also find use as supplied instructional material for American special forces.111
Managing the Homefront
A final lesson that current counterinsurgents have learned from the late-colonial
wars is how to avoid a collapse of domestic support. Even after fifty years of practical
experience, democracies still have difficulties with conducting ‘‘small’’ wars, largely
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because of a vacillating or resistant attitude on the part of voters toward counterinsur-
gency campaigns.112 The greater part of the scholarly literature presumes that a central
reason for these difficulties stems from the relatively low tolerance of postheroic soci-
eties for military casualties. Objections to the ever-mounting casualty toll of Western
soldiers played a decisive role in the collapse of support for late-colonial campaigns in
both North Africa and Indochina. Central to the effort to avoid similar objections to
the current wars has been the refusal of Western militaries to deploy conscript troops
and the decision instead to utilize mercenaries on a previously unimaginable scale.
American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan have included the largest body of private
armed forces in history, during some periods outnumbering regular troops.113 In
March 2011 roughly 174,000 contractors were present in Iraq and Afghanistan.114
Correspondingly, the number of mercenaries killed at least periodically exceeds that
of soldiers in the U.S. Army.115 Irregular fighters at the side of regular military forma-
tions, additionally, mirror the massive use of indigenous or even white supporting
formations in the colonial or decolonization wars.116 In the earlier episodes, the arming
and recruitment of as many ‘‘natives’’ as possible aimed to break down cultural differ-
ences, promote ‘‘modernization,’’ and counteract the impression of occupation or
foreign rule.117 Moreover, the building up of autochthonous police and security forces,
a task judged central in all counterinsurgency doctrines, makes it possible to present
realistic exit strategies to an increasingly critical home front. From Vietnam to Afghan-
istan, the military has made major media events of elaborately staged handovers of
weaponry, spheres of responsibility, and military quadrants. Lewis Sorley and his best-
seller on Vietnam, read by Biden and Obama, coined an emblematic formula for the
civil-military learning processes from history: A Better War.118
While some Western military leaders continue to criticize the application of ‘‘soft
power’’ to create a materially better future for the subject populations of the Long
War, in public American and European officers have preferred to present such efforts
as the conditio sine qua non of enduring military and political success.119 These military
leaders, and their political masters, continue to depict military ‘‘security’’ and devel-
opment assistance as tightly intermeshed mechanisms, even when they represent still-
separate worlds in practice. In the military apparatus, the adepts of the counterinsur-
gency doctrine depict civil development workers as an integral part of, not as a
competitor or an obstacle to, the military work. For a growing portion of persons in
development organizations, military preparation and protection of the terrain is in
many cases accepted as a necessary precondition of their work, as is civilian work for
military commanders. This mutual comprehension seems much greater than it was
fifty years ago. Whatever the lingering resentments between the two spheres, devel-
opment and military have begun to synchronize and co-adapt their respective forms
of action. In comparison to the 1950s, the consciousness of a certain reciprocal depen-
dency seems to have risen strongly. Frequently the military and civil machines for
security and change appear bound to each other according to the logic of a catch-22,
which also applies to the linkage between military and NGOs in the field.120 Leading
American development economists and officers in military reconstruction teams in
Afghanistan perceive ministerial bureaucracy and the ponderousness of ‘‘planners’’ as
enemies, while the ‘‘searchers,’’ flexible decision makers on the ground, are praised as
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models for the future.121 This constellation, too, deeply resembles the decolonization
wars of the 1950s.
Conclusions
The aim of this essay has not been to discredit humanitarian intervention through the
use of anticolonial rhetoric but rather to discuss the astonishing rediscovery of colonial
techniques of power, violence, and domination, and to explain with it the
‘‘modernity’’ of the late-colonial wars in the decades after 1945. Both scenarios
involved the violent assertion of Western interests; both featured the coupling of
military force with development programs; both proceeded with sophisticated
programs of social engineering and attempts to make the encountered societies ‘‘more
Western.’’ In both scenarios, postheroic Western democracies took pains to construct
narratives that legitimated the use of military force before a critical public. To this can
be added internationally coordinated actions in gray areas of international law that
cannot be termed ‘‘wars’’: the classification of opponents as terrorists, bandits, and
backward-looking violent criminals; and immense efforts to win the trust of affected
civilian populations. Both the late-colonial wars and today’s Long War were charac-
terized by the ardent optimism of true believers, the engagement of thousands in aid
organizations, and not least the grand design of modernization theory and modern-
izing plans.122
At the same time, comparing contemporary ‘‘transformative invasions’’ to late-
colonial wars obviously opens the door to political criticism of recent military inter-
ventions under the guise of the Long War.123 First, as we have seen, the argument that
humanitarian goals and near-term exit strategies stand for a genuinely new sort of
military operation, rather than the enduring neocolonial occupation of a region, was
fully developed and tested in the late phase of colonialism. Indirect rule is a genuinely
colonial concept in many respects structurally akin to contemporary efforts.124 Just as
with today’s Long War, the Western objective in the late-colonial wars was not direct
colonial domination but rather lasting, informal, and indirect control and manipu-
lation. Second, arguments that the Long War, waged ‘‘at the periphery,’’ is somehow
‘‘irregular’’ contain two basic imperial ideas: first, the power to define the geographical
and political boundary beyond which the possibility of ‘‘regular’’ warfare ends; second,
the arbitrary definition of what it is that signifies ‘‘regular’’ and therefore legitimate
warfare. Every colonial army has utilized precisely this model of argumentation—not
only in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. After all, extremely violent operations
in poorly understood territories lie at the dark heart of colonial rule itself. Unsurpris-
ingly, so-called unrest and outbreaks of barbarism in these territories in most cases
can be attributed at least partially to colonial influence—a fact as true of today’s wars
as those of the late-colonial period. Ultimately, choosing whether or not to label the
Long War’s colonially inspired form of warfare ‘‘neocolonial,’’ ‘‘neoimperial,’’ or
‘‘humanitarian’’ is a question of semantic and ideological self-identification.
Beyond such normative questions, it is worth emphasizing that the democratic
ideal of ‘‘transformative invasion,’’ in which anthropology-savvy soldiers, acting as
protectors of the population, differentiate between good and evil, or between ‘‘drivers’’
and ‘‘spoilers of change,’’ and then apply force in doses as a door-opener for progress
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and development—a war, in other words, that is at bottom not a war but a form of
armed development assistance—appears to belong to the forms of modern utopianism
that have appeared repeatedly since the end of World War II, in endless variations on
a recursive theme, with the Long War its latest iteration. A more exact and critical
examination of the historical experience of transformative invasions need not lead to
less political action, but it will almost certainly lead to greater skepticism about the
value of the colonial archive for driving contemporary approaches to counterinsur-
gency.
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